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IV 
COMES NOW, Third Party Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Roberta Shore 
(hereinafter"Roberta Shore"), by and through her attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and 
submits this Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in the above-titled matter. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal involves the legal malpractice of Nicholas Bokides (hereinafter "Bokides") 
arising from his representation of Roberta Shore during her divorce from William R. Shore 
(hereinafter "William Shore"). Roberta Shore's claims against Bokides arise from the failure of 
Bokides to notify McCormick International USA, Inc. (hereinafter "McCormick") and Agricredit 
Acceptance, LLC (hereinafter "Agricredit") that Roberta Shore would no longer guaranty repayment 
of future advances offunds to Bear River Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter "Bear River") based upon her 
guarantee. As a result of Bokides' failure to notify McCormick and Agricredit, McCormick and 
Agricrcdit sued Roberta Shore on her guaranty and subsequently obtained a judgment against 
Roberta Shore in the amount of $342,417.42 for eight (8) tractors and/or loaders financed by Bear 
River. 
Bokides does not dispute that he failed to notify McCormick and Agricredit, as agreed, or 
that his failure/negligence resulted in ajudgment against Roberta Shore. Instead, Bokides attempts 
to shift the blame to Roberta Shore and asserts that Robelia Shore failed to mitigate her damages by 
failing to pursue a separate legal action against William Shore even though she testified that she 
considered such an action, and based upon her finances and her knowledge of William Shore's 
finances, determined such an action to be futile. The trier offact, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, 
agreed with Roberta Shore and concluded that Roberta Shore's actions were "taken in the exercise 
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of due care" and she did not fail to mitigate her damages. The trier of fact considered the arguments 
of Bokides and found that he "did not present sufficient evidence" and did not meet his burden of 
proving Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages. Bokides now seeks to not only second guess 
Roberta Shore's decisions regarding her ability to fund a separate lawsuit against William Shore, and 
her conclusions as to William Shore's assets, liabilities and financial capability of paying a 
judgment, but to also second guess the trier of fact's decision that her decisions were reasonable and 
with due care. However, there is substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision that 
Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigate her damages and the district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
The district court also held that the judgment entered against Roberta Shore involving her 
guarantee for one of the eight tractors/loaders, which was financed more than five months after 
Bokides had agreed to provide notification to McCormick and Agricredit, was not proximately 
caused by the negligence/malpractice ofBokides because it was financed prior to the divorce decree 
being entered. Roberta Shore has filed a cross-appeal as to this portion of the district court's 
decision because she contends that allowing Bokides five to six months to provide notification to 
McCormick and Agricredit was not a reasonable time as a matter of law. Bear River was in the 
business of financing and selling tractors, loaders and other equipment and it was reasonable to 
expect that it would be financing equipment during the divorce. Thus, Roberta Shore respectfully 
requests that the district court's decision be reversed with respect to the one tractor financed prior 
to the entering of the divorce decree. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION. 
Bokides provided a course of proceedings section in his opening brief and Roberta Shore 
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does not disagree with the course of proceedings provided by Bokides. Thus, rather than redundantly 
restating the course of proceedings Roberta Shore will refer the Court to Bokides' opening brief. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Roberta Shore disagrees with portions of the statement of facts submitted by Bokides. and 
therefore, submits her own statement of facts. Furthermore, Roberta Shore would point the Court 
to the findings of fact by the district court which also summarize the facts and evidence presented 
to the district court during the one day court trial (See R. pgs. 595-613). 
1. McCormick is a manufacturer of farm equipment. In order to market its equipment, 
McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships with local, but independently owned dealers. 
[n 2005, a dealership with Bear River was created for the retail sale of McCormick tractors and other 
farm equipment. CR. pg. 149). 
2. In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River 
entered into agreements with Agricredit which were executed by Will iam Shore and Roberta Shore 
on behalf of Bear River. Bear River executed an "Inventory Security Agreement" and a "Retail 
Financing Agreement" with Agricredit on March 22, 2005. As part of the Inventory Security 
Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited power of attorney which provided Agricredit 
with authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River, certain documents in the normal course of 
business, including "Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm 
equipment from McCormick, the equipment would be financed or "floored" through Agricredit. 
Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed by Bear River through the use of the limited 
power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to the customer, the proceeds of the sale were to 
be placed in a trust account, separate and apart from Bear River's other funds. 
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3. On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal 
guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear 
River to Agricredit. 
4. In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling 
equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply said 
proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to placc said monies in a trust account as required by the 
agreements with Agricredit. 
5. McCormick and Agricredit had previously entered into an agreement wherein 
McCormick reimbursed Agricredit for the amounts financed to McCormick's dealers if Agricredit 
was unable to collect monies it had provided for the purchase or flooring of McCormick equipment. 
By assignment dated March 14,2008, Agricredit transferred to McCormick all of its right, title and 
interest to the obligation owed by Bear River to Agricredit. The personal guarantees referenced in 
paragraph 3 were part of the all-inclusive rights assigned to McCormick. 
6. The Guaranty signed by Roberta Shore contained the following provision: 
And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the 
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall 
have received at its Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor 
or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of the 
Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this 
guaranty. 
(R. pg. 37,43). 
7. On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William 
Shore and Roberta Shore in their individual capacities. CR. pg. 1). McCormick moved for summary 
judgment on May 20, 2010. (R. pg. 252). McCormick's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
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granted June 10,2010. (R. pg. 408). Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and 
Roberta on June 29,2010 in the sum of$319,977.98. (R. pg. 434). 
8. The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from 
the sale of the equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the Agreements bctween 
Bear River and Agricredit. Thc Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these 
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized as 
follows: 
Serial No. Model No. Date Financed 
JJE2026767 MC115 Tractor 10/23/06 
JJE3337250 MTX135 Tractor 12/21/06 
JJE3337193 MTX120 Tractor 12/21/06 
7183970 MCQL145 Loader 12/21106 
JJE2059356 CXI05 Tractor 1104/07 
JJE2058843 CX85 Tractor 3/15007 
7217799 MCQL165 Loader 5/29/07 
7217796 MCQL 165 Loader 5/29/07 
(R. pg. 187, see also Exhibits 203 and 105). 
9. On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded and an Amended 
Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of$342,417.42. CR. 
pg.477). 
10. In March of 2006, Roberta Shore engaged the services of Bokides to represent her 
in a divorce proceeding in Washington County, Idaho, Shore v. Shore Case No. CV 2006-000368. 
Roberta Shore advised Bokides of the above-referenced personal guarantee and Bokides agreed to 
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notify, in writing, Agricredit that Roberta Shore would no longer be a guarantor for the obligations 
of Bear River. While there has been some dispute around this issue at trial, it is clear Bokides 
acknowledged that Roberta Shore asked him to send the letters revoking her guarantee prior to May 
of 2006. (Tr. pgs. 13, Ins. 4-22; see also R. pg. 603). 
] 1. Ihe evidence is undisputed that Bokides did not send the letters he promised to send 
to Agricredit revoking Roberta Shore's personal guarantee. (Tr. pg. 173, Ins. 5-7). Bokides did not 
contact McCormick or Agricredit to determine if removing Roberta Shore's personal guarantee 
would negatively impact Bear River's ability to obtain financing in the future. (Ir. pg. 193. Ins. 7-
22). Further, Bokides did not dispute had he sent the letters which he agreed to do before October 
23, 2006, Roberta Shore would never have been a party to this action and McCormick/ Agri-Credit 
would not have obtained the above-referenced Judgment against her. (Tr. pgs. 188-189, Ins 21-1). 
12. Bokides suggests that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages by failing to bring 
a cause of action against William Shore. At the time the cause of action was brought against Roberta 
Shore, she met with James G. Reid to discuss her options. She was advised of a potential con11ict 
and a written waiver of that con£1ict was obtained from both Roberta Shore and William Shore. (Tr. 
pg. 21, Ins. 9-20). Roberta Shore independently determined not to make a claim against William 
Shore based upon her personal knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and 
net worth. (Ir. pg. 21-22, Ins. 21-23). 
13. Roberta Shore testified that having been married to William Shore she was aware of 
the assets. liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits of William Shore. The testimony was also 
undisputed that Roberta Shore was also aware of those same assets, liabilities, judgments and 
pending lawsuits after the divorce. Jd. In fact, Roberta Shore was a party to some of the lawsuits 
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and continues to have a security interest in some of the assets of William Shore. 
14. The testimony at trial was also undisputed that the Divorce Decree (Exhibit 103), 
does not specifically state that William Shore will indemnify Roberta Shore for her obligations 
pursuant to her guarantees. (Tr. 103-104, Ins. 12-5). The Divorce Decree provides at paragraph VI 
that William Shore will indemnify Roberta Shore for "indebtedness related to the closely held 
corporation Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc." 
15. As to William Shore's assets, the undisputed testimony was that William Shore has 
a negative net worth and William Shore may have to file bankruptcy at some point in the future. (Tr. 
pg. I 03. Ins. 1-6). The Financial Statement dated February 26,2010 (Exhibit 113) does not include 
the above-mentioned Judgment ofMcCormick/Agri-Credit. (Tr. pg. 99, Ins. 7-18). William Shore's 
testimony was that the value of the assets listed on the Financial Statement if sold pursuant to 
execution, would be significantly less than the amounts he listed on the Financial Statement he 
prepared. (Tr. pg. 101, Ins. 2-13). There was a suggestion at trial that William Shore had offered 
to settle the suit with McCormick for $100,000.00 but the undisputed testimony was that William 
Shore would have to borrow the money to accomplish a settlement. (Tr. pg. 74, Ins. 10-20). 
U. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues asserted by Bokides on appeal can be summarized as follows: 
I. Whether the district court erred in finding that Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigated 
her damages? 
HI. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Roberta Shore raises the following issues on cross-appeal: 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling that Roberta Shore's damages did not 
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include the amount due to McCormick for the tractor that was floored on or about 
October 28, 2007? 
3. Whether Roberta Shore is entitled to its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result 
of this appeal? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the district court's decision, the appellate court's: 
decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. A district court's 
findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the 
judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier offact It is the province 
ofthe district judge acting as trier offact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony 
and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. [The appellate court] will not substitute 
[its] view of the facts for the view of the district court. Instead, where findings of 
fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, those 
findings will not be overturned on appeal. [The appellate courts] exercise free review 
over the lower court's conclusions oflaw. however, to determine whether the court 
correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained 
by the facts found. 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 521,20 P.3d 
702, 705 (2001) (citations omitted). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court's Holding that Roberta Shore Did Not Fail to Mitigation Her 
Damages is Supported bv Substantial Evidence. 
While packaged in a number of different arguments, Bokides' entire appeal is limited to 
arguments concerning mitigation of damages. Mitigation of damages is defined by IDJI2d 9.14 as 
follows: "Any person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage 
and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered." Idaho courts have consistently held that the burden ofprooflies with the party asserting 
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the affirmative defense. More specifically, the burden of proof as to mitigation of damages is on the 
party causing the alleged damages, Bokides in this instance. See Davis v. First Interstate Bank, 115 
Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915, 643 P.2d 1085 eCt. 
App. 1982). Thus, the burden is on Bokides to prove that Roberta Shore did not exercise reasonable 
care to mitigate her damages. 
The district court, relying upon IDJI 9.14 and 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 
134 (Ct.App. 1990), found that Bokides did not meet his burden and that Roberta Shore's actions 
were taken in the exercise of due care. As the trier of fact, the district court considered the 
testimony of Roberta Shore and William Shore, along with the documentary evidence, and concl uded 
that Roberta Shore made a "knowing and intelligent decision based upon her knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding [William Shore's] finances" and that Roberta Shore did not have 
alternative remedies which were viable and equivalent. The district court's conclusions were 
supported by the testimony of Roberta Shore that she had personal knowledge of the finances of 
William Shore arising out of her fifteen year marriage and the finances, and debts, associated with 
the dissolution of said marriage. While Bokides may second guess or question the findings and 
evidence, Bokides has not and cannot demonstrate that the district cOUli's findings and conclusions 
are not supported by substantial evidence. 
1. Roberta Shore Did Not Have Alternative Remedies which were Viable and 
Equivalent. 
Bokides argues that the facts and issues presented in 0 'Neil v. Vasseur are instructive to the 
case at bar. Interestingly, the district cOUli also found 0 'Neil v. Vasseur insightful in that it provides 
if "an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with an alternative 
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remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result may be that the client suffers 
no loss as the proximate loss ofthe attorneys negligent conduct." ld. at 262. (emphasis added). The 
district court found that Roberta Shore did not have alternative remedies which were both viable and 
equivalent because "she was faced with the prospect of incurring additional expenses and attorney 
fees to pursue what she knew to be a judgment proof individual from her own personal knowledge 
arising out of her fifteen year marriage and the finances associated with the dissolution of that 
marriage." (R. pg. 610). Thus, to the extent Bokides is relying upon 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, the facts of 
this case, as found by the district court, are distinguishable because Roberta Shore did not have 
alternative remedies which were viable and equivalent. 
Moreover, the case of 0 'Neil v. Vasseur involved a situation in which an attorney failed to 
pursue a claim on behalfofthe plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then pursued the claim on their own behalf 
and the court found that they properly mitigated their damages. In this case, unlike 0 'Neil v. 
Vasseur, the malpractice of Bokides does not arise from his failure to pursue a claim on behalf of 
Roberta Shore. This is not a situation where the legal malpractice arises from Bokides' failure to 
pursue William Shore. In other words, it is not analogous to 0 'Neil v. Vasseur because the claim 
which gives rise to the malpractice is different from the claim which Bokides now suggests Roberta 
Shore failed to pursue. In 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, the "viable and equivalent" remedy was to pursue the 
claim which the attorney failed to pursue. In this case, Bokides' malpractice is based upon his 
failure to notify McCormick and Agricredit to remove Roberta Shore from the guarantees. Bokides 
is not suggesting and there is no evidence to support the argument that Roberta Shore failed to 
mitigate her damages because she failed to notify McCormick and Agricredit because, as the district 
court correctly found, she did not learn that the notification did not occur until after the eight 
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tractors/loaders were f1oored. Instead, Bokides is suggesting that Roberta Shore should bring a 
separate legal action against William Shore. Notwithstanding the fact that such a separate action 
would be futile based upon the testimony and evidence, bringing a separate action against William 
Shore, is not the equivalent ofBokides notifying McCormick and Agricredit to remove her from the 
guarantees. 
Bokides also cites to Theobaldv. Byers, 193 Cal.App 2d 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) and Lewis 
v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.App. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), "for the proposition that in legal 
malpractice actions, if there is a potential source of recovery for the plaintiff, then the recovery 
against the defendant attorney is reduced or eliminated by the amount potentially recoverable." 
While Lewis v. Superior Court held that "[ u ]pon the trial of the matter defendant may seek establish 
that plaintiff has a collectible interest in the pension," it still requires the defendant to meet his 
burden of showing that a failure to mitigate damages. The same is true in this case where Bokides 
"may seek to establish that" Roberta Shore has an alternative remedy which is viable and equivalent 
at trial, but Bokides was unsuccessful in meeting his burden. 
Over Roberta Shore's objection, the district court allowed Bokides to amend his answer to 
pursue the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate but found that Roberta Shore's action were the 
exercise of ordinary, due care. The district court properly relied upon Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 
Idaho 129, 136,910 P.2d 801,808 (Ct.App. 1996), and found that: 
Bokides did not present sufficient evidence at trial that Roberta's pursuit of 
William would have lead to a collectible judgment that would have satisfied or 
decreased her liability to McCormick. Rather the evidence at trial and this 
Court's findings of fact support the opposite conclusion that it would only have 
added to the already disastrous financial status of William and placed Roberta in line 
with a handful of other creditors attempting to collect money and judgments against 
him. 
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(R. pg. 611 ) (emphasis added). Bokides simply did not meet his burden. 
2. The District Court Did Not Err in Holding that Roberta Shore's Actions were 
Taken in the Exercise of Reasonable, Ordinary, Due Care. 
Bokides makes a number of unsupported assertions which do not change or alter the findings 
and conclusions ofthe district court. First, Bokides makes the unsupported assertion that there was 
an impression that Roberta Shore and William Shore colluded to have Bokides pay the judgment 
obtained by McCormick. Such an assertion is not supported by the evidence but also makes no sense 
given the fact that it was the actions/inactions ofBokides that would have prevented Roberta Shore 
from being sued in the first place, i.e., he was the one that agreed to send the notification. 
Bokides then argues that because Roberta Shore and William Shore did not file any 
opposition to the summary jUdgment motion of McCormick, it suggests they did not have any 
motivation to avoid Bokides paying the entire amount. Again, there is no evidence in the record to 
support such assertions, but the fact of the matter was that Roberta Shore did not have a meritorious 
defense to McCormick's summary judgment motion given that she had not been removed from her 
personal guarantee of the tractors/loaders financed by McCormick. 
Bokides also argues that Robelia Shore failed to mitigate her damages because she did not 
retain independent counsel to represent her. Bokides fails to mention the testimony and evidence 
presented at trial that at the time McCormick initiated the lawsuit against her, she was advised of a 
potential conflict and a written waiver of that conflict was obtained from both Roberta Shore and 
William Shore. (Tr. pg. 21, Ins. 16-20). Prior to bringing a third party action against Bokides, 
Roberta Shore independently determined not to make a claim against William Shore based upon her 
personal knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and net worth. (Tr. pg. 21-22, 
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Ins. 16-23; pgs. 27-28, Ins. 23-2). Thus, the same determination that the district court held was an 
exercise of due care to not pursue an independent action against William Shore, was made before 
Roberta Shore initiated a third party claim against Bokides. Moreover, Roberta Shore testified that 
she asked Bokides if he thought it was okay for her to retain the same counsel as William Shore and 
Bokides told her "he didn't see any reason not to, that that would be fine." (Tr. pg. 21, Ins. 1-15). 
Thus, the very decision that Bokides is now second guessing was approved by Bokides according 
to the testimony of Roberta Shore. 
Bokides' assertion that Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct \vould prevent 
Roberta Shore from making a claim against William Shore is misplaced because Roberta Shore had 
already made a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue a claim against William Shore. i 
Those actions were found to be an exercise of ordinary, due care and should not be disturbed on 
appeal. Moreover, Roberta Shore testified that she understood that she could always hire a different 
lawyer if and when she believed it would be productive to pursue William Shore. (Tr. pg. 6 L Ins. 
3-22; pgs. 97-98, Ins. 22-3). Roberta Shore was not "legally handicapped from taking any steps to 
pursue any claims against" William Shore as suggested by Bokides because, as she testified, she 
"knew at any time, I could go hire any lawyer I want to hire to do whatever I want to do." (Tr. pg. 
59, Ins. 14-22; pg. 61, Ins. 13-22). 
J Bokides asserts that William Shore had a "clear, unequivocal obligation to both defend 
and indemnify Roberta from any and all indebtedness from Bear River." Appellate's Brief, pg. 
21. However, William Shore's obligations to Roberta Shore under the divorce decree were not 
as clear and unequivocal as Bokides contends. William Shore had an obligation to indemnify 
and defend for Bear River indebtedness. While the underlying transactions related to the 
financing/flooring of Bear River equipment, Roberta Shore was sued by McCormick based upon 
her "personal guaranty." Thus, the testimony and evidence at trial was that part of Roberta 
Shore's decision included the expenses of pursuing William Shore, whether the claim was viable, 
and then whether she would simply obtain an uncollectable judgment. 
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Bokides plays "Monday Morning Quarterback" and suggests a number of actions Roberta 
Shore "could have" taken. However, speculating as to these steps is nothing more than second 
guessing the trier of fact's decision. Again, the district court considered the testimony of Roberta 
Shore and found her testimony credible as to her personal knowledge of the finances during her 
fifteen year marriage and dissolution of that marriage and that she made a knowing and intelligent 
decision. Speculation and second guessing actions Roberta Shore could have taken does not change 
the fact that the trier of fact's decision was supported by substantial evidence. 
Perhaps the most obvious attempt of Bokides to re-argue the facts presented to the trier of 
fact relates to Bokides' assertion that he "believes" the finances of William Shore were "most likely 
understated." Appellate's Briel pg. 26. Bokides then speculates that William Shore's net worth was 
understated because of William Shore' s mistaken assumptions as to his assets and personal I iabil ities 
and "it is likely that there would be some assets from the bankruptcy estate to satisfy a portion of 
McCormick's judgment.,,2 Appellate's Brief; pg. 28. However, the evidence concerning William 
Shore's net worth was weighed and considered by the district court and the district court macle a 
specific finding as to those assets and liabilities. See R. pgs. 604-605. Those findings, along with 
Roberta Shore's personal knowledge of William Shore's net worth, are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence and should not be overturned on appeal simply because Bokides speculates that 
2 Bokides also speculates that William Shore's net worth may have decreased between 
the time of McCormick's initial lawsuit, August 2008, and the time of trial, August 2010. 
Again, the evidence presented to the district court was that Roberta Shore's decision not to 
pursue William Shore was made prior to her bringing a third party action against Bokides. Thus, 
it is not as if she waited two years to make her decision as suggested by Bokides. It should also 
be noted that it took McCormick nearly two years to obtain a judgment against Roberta Shore 
and William Shore based upon their personal guarantees and Bokides is simply speculating that 
Roberta Shore could obtain ajudgment against William Shore in less time. 
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they were undervalued. 
Finally, Bokides raises a number of "what if' questions relating to the potential satisfaction 
of the McCormick judgment. First, Bokides did not raise the issue below that the judgment obtained 
by Roberta Shore against Bokides should be modified depending on the satisfaction of the 
Iv1cCormick judgment. The appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. Clear Springs Food. Inc. v. Spackman, 2011 LEXIS 44, 252 P.3D 71 (2011). Second, these 
"what if' scenarios do not change the fact that McCormick has a judgment against Roberta Shore 
as a direct and proximate result of the negligence/malpractice ofBokides. This is not disputed by 
Bokides and he has raised no argument that his failure to send notifications to McCormick was not 
the proximate cause of the judgment. (Tr. pgs. 188-189, Ins. 21-1). As the district court properly 
concluded, the judgment against Roberta Shore was the proximate result of Bokides' breach and 
thus she was damaged whcn the McCormick judgment was entered.3 
B. The District Court Erred in Not Including the Tractor Floored Prior to the Divorce 
Decree in the Judgment. 
The district court failed to include the tractor f100red on October 23, 2006 because it was 
11oOl'ed prior to the divorce being completed. The district court found that a reasonable time for 
Bokides to notify McCormick and Agricredit to relieve Roberta Shore from her personal guarantee 
obligations was six months or until the divorce decree was entered. However, Roberta Shore 
suggests that a reasonable time for an ongoing business, with ongoing financing and f1ooring, is not 
six months and the district court's decision that the tractor financed prior to the divorce decree was 
not proximately caused by Bokides' breach should be reversed. 
3 The McCormick judgment was entered against Roberta Shore prior to the trial in this 
matter and prior to the district court's decision. 
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The district court found that during one of the meetings between Roberta Shore and Bokides, 
the last of which \vas May of 2006, Bokides agreed to notify McCormick and Agricredit of her 
decision to terminate the personal guarantees. It is undisputed that Bokides failed to provide such 
notification. Approximately six months later the divorce was completed the divorce decree was 
entered on November 16,2006. Of the eight tractors/loaders which McCormick sued Roberta Shore 
on her personal guarantee, only one was financedlfloored prior to the divorce decree. This tractor 
was financedlfloored on October 23,2006 and the sum claimed by McCormick relative to this tractor 
was $43,331.89. 
As to when the notification would occur, the district court found that Roberta Shore did not 
see why the notification could not occur immediately and that she expected the notification to be 
done by the time the divorce was completed. (R. pg. 603). Bokides suggested that the notification 
would not be until the divorce was finalized but the district court held that it did not accept Bokides' 
version of the events, but instead found Roberta Shore's testimony more credible. CR. pg. 603, 
footnote 4). Thus, the district court's own findings were that the there was no reason why the 
notification could not occur immediately and it would be done by the time the divorce was 
completed. Yet, the district court found that a tractor floored five months after Bokides agreed to 
send the notification, and less than four weeks before the divorce was completed, was not included 
in Roberta Shore's damages. In other words, the district court's findings suggest that a reasonable 
time for Bokides to send the notification was anytime prior to the divorce being completed, 
November 16, 2006. 
The district court relied upon Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 
299,318,233 P .3d 1221, 1240 (2010) which holds that where no time of performance is stated, the 
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law implies a reasonable time. However, Roberta Shore contends that a reasonable time under these 
circumstances was not six months later or when the divorce decree was entered. Bear River was 
continuously in the business offinancing, flooring and selling tractors, loaders and other equipment 
during the divorce proceedings. Because of the continuous, ongoing business and financing, it was 
important for Roberta Shore to be removed from her personal guarantee as soon as possible. The 
business was being managed by an individual named Tom Lewis and Roberta Shore had no way of 
knowing when and how many tractors/loaders were being floored and financed. (Tr. pgs. 32-33, Ins. 
21-10). The divorce litigation could have taken three months or three years and it was completely 
arbitrary to select the divorce decree as the implied time of performance. A reasonable time should 
have been no more than sixty (60) days but in no event as long as six months. Even if Bokides were 
allowed one-hundred twenty (120) days, Roberta Shore would have no liability to 
McCormick/ Agricredit. 
Again, the district court's own findings were that Roberta Shore's testimony was more 
credible than Bokides and that she did not see why the notification was not immediately provided 
or at least prior to the divorce being completed. In fact, Roberta Shore testified that she understood 
that Bokides would provide the notifications as soon as he could, there was no condition as to when 
he would do it and that she assumed he would proceed "promptly." (Tr. pgs. 13-15, Ins. 19 -11). 
She testified there "was no reason to hold offon it. Uhm, I didn't see why it should have been done 
right away, but we didn't discuss it." (Tr. pg. 44, Ins. 9-15). The expectation of the witness in which 
the trier of fact found most credible was that it would be done promptly and right away and not six 
months later when the di vorce was final. In fact, Robelia Shore testified that there was no discussion 
about waiting until the divorce decree was entered to send the notifications. (Tr. pg. 19, Ins. 6-22; 
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pg. 45, Ins. 2-6). Finally, Roberta Shore testified that if Bokides would have provided the 
notification in a reasonable time, "even as late as September 2006", McCormick would not have 
sued her. (Tr. pgs. 30-31, Ins. 11-6). 
F or these reasons, Roberta Shore respectfully requests that the district court's decision be 
reversed as to the one tractor financed prior to the divorce decree. Even if there were no indications 
of trouble with Bear River, a reasonable time under the law to notify McCormick/ Agricredit that 
Roberta Shore intended to revoke her personal guarantee for flooring lines of Bear River equipment 
is certainly less than five months. There was no reasonable, rational reason not to remove Roberta 
Shore from the personal guarantees as soon as possible following the May 2006 agreement to do so 
which in no event should have taken until October 23, 2006 (the day the only tractor was t1oOl'ed 
prior to the entry of the divorce decree). 
C. Roberta Shore is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, Roberta Shore requests attorney fees and costs 
be awarded to her on appeaL With regard to attorney fees, Roberta Shore claims attorney fees under 
I.e. § 12-120(3), which provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
(emphasis added). 
The statute goes on to define commercial transaction as follows: "(tJhe term 'commercial 
transaction' is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes." I.e. § 12-120(3). 
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In City o/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court 
overruled the decision in Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425,807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991) and held 
that I.e. § 12-120(3) applies to legal malpractice actions. The Court reasoned that the latter part of 
the statute is not limited to contract actions and only requires that there be a commercial transaction. 
ld. at 665,201 P.3d at 638. Thus, the fact that although a legal malpractice action may sound in tort, 
attorney fees are awardable under I.C. § 12-120(3) if the underlying matter involved a commercial 
transaction. 
In this case, in the underlying matter, Plaintiff, McCormick, made certain claims, and 
ultimately obtained a judgment, against Roberta Shore based upon her guaranty. The guaranty 
related to the flooring lines of tractors and other equipment sold for commercial purposes by Bear 
River. The judgment against Roberta Shore was based upon a commercial transaction, and the 
district court awarded attorney fees against Roberta Shore, and in favor of McCormick. in the 
underlying action, for these reasons (R. pg. 468). The very guaranty that forms the basis of 
McCormick's cause of action against Roberta Shore is also the basis of the legal malpractice action 
against Bokides. Accordingly, Roberta Shore's cause of action against Bokides based upon is failure 
to remove her from said personal guarantees is based upon a commercial transaction. Indeed, 
Bokides does not dispute that the this action is based upon a commercial transaction as Bokides as 
also claimed attorney fees on appeal for the same reasons.4 
Once a cause of action is brought which is covered by 1. C. § 12-120(3), the award of attorney 
fees is mandatory. Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 952 P.2d 914 (CLApp. 1998). 
4 It should be noted that the district court awarded attorney fees to Roberta Shore based 
upon I.e. § 12-120(3) and Bokides did not appeal any portion of the district court's decision and 
supplemental judgment pertaining to attorney fees. 
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The mandatory award of attorney fees in this case is consistent with Idaho precedent holding that 
I.e. § 12-120(3) is applicable when the underlying debt is based upon an open account, note, bill, 
contract, or any other commercial transaction covered by I. C. § 12-120(3). See Durrant v. Quality 
First /vfarketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 903 P.2d 147 (Ct.App. 1995) (awarding attorney fees to the 
prevailing party pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) in an action to pierce the corporate veil when the 
underlying action and debt upon which the plaintiff sought to hold the principal individually liable 
was either an open account, note. bilL contract or commercial transaction covered by I.C. § 12-
120(3); A/pine Packing Company v. HH Keim Company, Limited, 121 Idaho 762,828 P.2d 325 
(CLApp. 1991) (holding that attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) were appropriately awardable to 
the prevailing party when one party sought to disregard a corporate entity to avoid collection on an 
open account). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
F or the foregoing reasons, Roberta Shore respectfully requests that the district court's 
decision be affirmed with regard to its decision to Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigate her 
damages. The district court's decision that her actions were reasonable and with the exercise of due 
care are supported by substantial evidence. 
Roberta Shore also respectfully requests that the district court's decision be reversed with 
respect to its decision that a reasonable amount of time for Bokides to notify McCormick and 
Agricredit to remove Roberta Shore from her guarantees was nearly six months later when the 
divorce was final. Accordingly, Roberta Shore requests reversal of the district court's decision to 
disallow her claim for damages relating to the tractor which was financed prior to the divorce being 
completed. Lastly, Robe11a Shore respectfully requests her attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
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appeal. 
DATED this ------''''-'''-_ day of August, 20 1l. 
-"~ RINGER;(i~;~ LHARTER / J 
/ / I 
By~(== __ ~~~~~ ____ ~ ____ ___ 
James eid 
Attor ys for Roberta Shore 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 
foregoing was served upon: 
Bradley J. Williams 
Charles Edwards Cather III 
day of August, 2011, two true and correct copies of the 
MotTatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
420 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51505 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANTS BRIEF - PAGE 22 
